What should India do to liberate Balochistan?

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Wars in Pakistan since 1945

India (Kashmir I, Azad Kashimiri Forces, 1947-1949)

AKUF database no .:

13

War duration:

22.10.1947 - 01.01.1949

War type:

A-2 / AC-2

End of war

through the mediation of third parties (UNO)

Belligerents

page A

Pashtuns [1]

Side B

cashmere

additional side A:

Troops of the Azad Kashmiri Forces (10/1947 - 01/1949)

Intervention in favor of A:

Pakistan (5/1948 - 1/1949)

Intervention in favor of B:

India (10/27/1947 - 1/1949)

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

Kashmir, which under British colonial rule had retained its independent organizational structure as a principality and was de jure an independent state after the division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in August 1947, was to be annexed either to India or to all 554 principalities at a later date to Pakistan. The Hindu Maharajah (with an 85% Muslim majority) tried to keep both options open by tactics. The Muslim independence movement was suppressed. From October 22, 1947, however, Pashtuns, who were under the command of Pakistani officers, infiltrated Kashmir from Pakistan and tried to force a decision in favor of an annexation to Pakistan. Most of the mostly Muslim, Kashmiri troops deserted and reorganized as a force of the "Azad (free) Kashmir" proclaimed in the conquered Poonch. Thereupon the Maharajah asked India on October 26th for military assistance, which it was only prepared to provide after the annexation of Kashmir to the Indian Union. A day later, the Indian army intervened in the war.

Under pressure from the Muslim League and its own Muslim population, the Pakistani government then intended to intervene on behalf of Azad Kashmir. Initially, a British officer, Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, was able to prevent Pakistani entry into the war by threatening to withdraw all British officers. This changed, however, with India's spring offensive in 1948, which torpedoed all Kashmiri negotiations. Under the pressure of a new wave of refugees and because of the closure of the Indus water, which is vital for Pakistan, Pakistani troops intervened in the war on the side of the insurgents, mainly in northern Kashmir. Brines (1968: 78) evaluates the Pakistani advance as an initiative to occupy as large an area of ​​Kashmir as possible before the expected partition, while Frey (1978: 37) interprets Pakistan's entry into the war as purely defensive, only to protect the border and economically important reservoir of the Jhelum River.


RESULTS OF THE WAR

As a result of the war, Kashmir was divided. India was awarded two thirds of Kashmir, which it later incorporated as the Union state "Jammu and Kashmir", which has a special status according to the Indian constitution; the remaining third - the mountainous north - was essentially "Azad-Kashmir", which is de facto administered by Pakistan. Some smaller territorial units have been incorporated directly into Pakistan. The referendum on the future of Kashmir, called for by the UN and promised by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, is still pending. [2]

At least 3,000 people were killed in the fighting.


REMARKS

[1] Also known as "Pathans".

[2] Cf. also Second Kashmir War 1965 (War No. 84), War for the Rann-von-Kutch 1965 (War No. 82), the War on the Siachen Glacier (War No. 161) and the Inner Kashmiri War ( War No. 188). In addition to the Indo-Pakistani power political contradictions, the 1971 Bangladesh War (No. 111). On war as a means of annexing the Indian principalities, see War No. 15 (Hyderabad).


Jens-Peter Franke

India / Pakistan (Rann-von-Kutch, 1965)

AKUF database no .:

82

War duration:

09.04.1965 - 01.07.1995

End of war

through the mediation of third parties (former colonial power)

Belligerents

page A

India

Side B

Pakistan

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

Against the background of the disputed border course in the Rann-von-Kutch between India and Pakistan, border skirmishes developed into a war limited to this region.

The Rann is a salt desert that only forms a lake during the monsoons from May to late autumn. Pakistani claims in the Rann refer to an internationally customary demarcation in the middle of the lake. India, on the other hand, claims the traditional western border between the former principality of Kutch and the Pakistani province of Sindh today.

Suspected but so far not proven oil deposits in the disputed area were named as the cause of the conflict. In fact, the latent Pakistani-Indian conflict, which came to a head in 1965, led to constant skirmishes in the disputed border regions (Rann, Kashmir), which were deliberately extended by Pakistan in the Rann in order to try out the Indian defense force in a "test war"; The Second Kashmir War followed in August (cf. War No. 84).


RESULTS OF THE WAR

The negotiations between Pakistan and India about the demarcation of the border on the Indian western border, which came about through British mediation, took place between 1966 and 1968 and led to the division of the Rann with 90% to India and 10% to Pakistan.

At least 450 soldiers were killed in the fighting.


Jens-Peter Franke

India (Kashmir II; Mujahids, 1965)

AKUF database no .:

84

War duration:

05.08.1965 - 23.09.1965

War type:

B-2 / BC-2

End of war

through the mediation of third parties (UNO)

Belligerents

page A

Mujahids (Muslim guerrillas) [1]

Side B.

India

additional side A:

Pakistan (08/16/1965 - 09/23/1965)

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

After the Mujahids infiltrated from Pakistan started a guerrilla war in the Indian part of Kashmir on August 5, 1965, Indian troops crossed the armistice line on August 16, 1965 and invaded the Pakistani part of Kashmir. The initially only minor countermeasures by the Pakistani military expanded into heavy tank battles along the entire 2,000 kilometer (west) Pakistani-Indian border at the beginning of September.

With this war, Pakistan intended to free Kashmir from a supposedly weak enemy, especially since India rejected the referendum on the Kashmiri future that Pakistan had called for with the support of the UN. In addition to preventing the separation of Kashmir, India wanted to restore the military and political self-confidence that it had suffered after its defeat in the Sino-Indian War in 1962.

The Second Kashmir War was only one high point of the relationship, which has been latently conflictual since the founding of the two states (1947) and which has only one point of escalation in the Kashmir problem, albeit the most important one. Constant skirmishes on the border (armistice line) in Kashmir, but also in Rann-von-Kutch, in which the demarcation of the border was disputed, were an expression of the permanent tensions between the two states.3 Indian troops had already crossed the Kashmiri armistice line in the Kargil region in May and took three Pakistani military posts, but withdrew again following intervention by the UN and the US.


RESULTS OF THE WAR

An apparently threatening expansion of the war through the entry of the People's Republic of China on the part of Pakistan (massive pro-Pakistani propaganda in the Chinese media, tensions on the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim) led to the intervention of the UN, which was ultimately able to broker a ceasefire . The PRC, which had an assistance pact with Pakistan, presumably used its threatening gestures to prevent India from opening another front in East Pakistan.

The status quo ante bellum as it had existed after the First Kashmir War was restored at the Tashkent Conference initiated by the Soviet Union on January 10, 1966. Minimal border changes that had resulted from the course of the war were revised.

At least 20,000 people were killed in the fighting.


REMARKS

[1] The Mujahids were largely recruited from Kashmiri Muslims who fought for free Kashmir ("Azad Kashmir"). It is not known whether they came from the part of Kashmir, which belongs to India or Pakistan.

[2] Cf. also First Kashmir War 1947 to 1949 (War No. 13), War for the Rann-von-Kutch 1965 (War No. 82), Bangladesh War 1971 (War No. 111), Siachen Glacier War 1984 to 1989 ( War No. 161) and the intra-Kashmiri War since 1990 (War No. 188); also the Sino-Indian War 1962 (War No. 66).



Jens-Peter Franke

Pakistan (Bangladesh, Mukti Fauj and others 1971)

AKUF database no .:

111

War duration:

25.3.1971 - 17.12.1971 [1]

War type:

B-1 / BC [2] -2

End of war

by military victory side B

Belligerents

page A

Pakistan

Side B

Various guerrilla movements, often referred to as "Freedom Fighters" (the largest being the Mukti Fauj ("People's Army")); next to it parts of the police force and paramilitary units (East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, "Ansar")

in addition to side B

India (03.12.1971 - 17.12.1971)

Intervention in favor of B:

India (6/1971 - 02.12.1971)

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

The background of the war was formed by the political, economic and linguistic-cultural disadvantage that the Bengali population of East Pakistan felt as well as its internal political instability. In terms of foreign policy, there was also the power-political rivalry between Pakistan and India that had existed since 1947 and had already led to three wars (see First and Second Kashmir Wars, Wars No. 13 and 84; War over the Rann-von-Kutch, War No. 82) .

The basic conflict that had been simmering for around 20 years between the two parts of Pakistan, 1,800 kilometers apart, escalated dramatically between the national elections of December 1970 and the end of March 1971. The overwhelming election victory of the secessionist, left-wing Awami League in East Pakistan was followed by parliamentary east-west polarization, which seemed to make intervention by the West Pakistani central government inevitable. Nevertheless, a negotiated solution between the military government and the Awami League initially emerged. The "point of no return" was reached when, under massive pressure from the most important West Pakistani civil opposition party Z.A. Bhuttos, who refused any concession to the secessionist movement, the military government in early March 1971 suspended the opening session of the Constituent Assembly. The civil disobedience campaign launched by the Awami League paralyzed public life and the administration of East Pakistan. Concurrent negotiations between the military government and the head of the Awami League, M. Rahman, were broken off by the head of state and military, Y. Khan, on March 25th. After his immediate departure from East Pakistan, the West Pakistani military units, which had previously been insidiously reinforced, were given the order to operate. Rahman was captured on March 26, but other Awami League politicians in India formed a government in exile that proclaimed the state of Bangladesh on the same day. In fact, however, the guerrilla movement became the decisive force in the civil war. The political survival of the government-in-exile was just as dependent on its military successes as it was on the goodwill of India.

The secessionist aspirations in East Pakistan met India's claim to hegemony in the region. As early as April 1971, India put pressure on the West Pakistani military stationed in East Pakistan by training insurgents and tightening the border regime on the border with East Pakistan. As a result of the influx of refugees growing to up to ten million people, the readiness for open military intervention grew in India. From June 1971, units of the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) penetrated deeper into East Pakistani territory to support guerrilla groups that were on the defensive. The escalation led to the Pakistani air force attacking Indian targets on December 3, which triggered large-scale combat operations on both the border with East and West Pakistan.

RESULTS OF THE WAR

In the former East Pakistan, the 75 million inhabitant state of Bangladesh was founded, but its internal consolidation failed to materialize as a result of power struggles, economic crises and natural disasters. In West Pakistan, in view of the outcome of the war, the military government had to resign; the civil opposition politician Z.A. Bhutto took over the business of government. The military, however, continued to have a significant influence on politics. The South Asian power structure changed permanently in favor of India with the establishment of Bangladesh.

At least 300,000 people were killed in the fighting.


REMARKS

[1] The war in the east came to an end on December 16, 1971 with the surrender of the West Pakistani units. On the West Pakistani front, the Pakistani army did not accept a ceasefire until December 17th.

[2] 1st phase: Civil war against the West Pakistani military from March 1971; 2nd phase: Increasing interventionist operations by the Indian border troops in favor of the insurgents from June 1971 to December 2nd; 3rd phase: Interstate war from December 3, 1971, continued secessionist component in East Pakistan.


Jens-Peter Franke

Pakistan (Balochistan I, BPLF, 1973-1977)

AKUF database no .:

171

War duration:

3/1973 - 7/1977

War type:

B-2 [1]

End of war

by military victory side B

Belligerents

page A

Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF)

Side B.

Pakistan

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

The subject of the conflict was the economic, social and political disadvantage of the Balochistan Province in Pakistan. The BPLF, which had a traditional-tribal base but was politically inspired by intellectuals and students (Balochistan Students Organization; BSO), some of whom were influenced by Marxism, fought for a multinational, socialist Pakistan in which Balochistan would be an equal, largely independent part of the country should. A minority, influenced by the model of Bangladesh, intended the secession of Pakistan and the consolidation of all Baluch in one state. This goal prompted the Shah of Persia to support the war of the Pakistani central government against the ethno-nationalist movement of Balochistan, since a considerable minority of Baluchis live in eastern Iran. As the war went on, the BPLF's objectives shifted towards secession.


RESULTS OF THE WAR

The Balochist guerrillas did not achieve their goals. But the four-year war helped to rehabilitate the Pakistani military, which was discredited by the defeat against India in 1971, as an instrument of order and political factor, and the civilian government Z.A. Destabilize Bhuttos. The Zia military regime launched a special development program for the province, but this did not remove the disadvantage.

The war claimed nearly 10,000 lives.


REMARKS

[1] Iranian attack helicopters and pilots sporadically participated in attacks by the Pakistani air force on the Baluch guerrillas. The background to Iran's siding with the regular Pakistani army was the aim of the Baluchs to consolidate all (including the Iranian) Baluch in one nation-state.


Peter Koerner

Pakistan / India (Siachen Glacier, 1984-1989)

AKUF database no .:

161

War duration:

4/1984 - 1989

War type:

C-2

End of war

by breaking off the fighting (fighting below level war)

Belligerents

page A

Pakistan

Side B.

India

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

The central subject of the conflict is a 4,500 km2, snow and glacier-covered high mountain region of the Karakoram Mountains, which is located in the north of the disputed princely state of Kashmir, which has been occupied by the two states since their independence. After the two Kashmir Wars (1947/49 and 1965), the mountain region was excluded from the definition of the armistice line (cf. Wars No. 13 and 82). This militarily and territorially limited "follow-up war" to the Kashmir conflict is - in addition to strategic aspects - also an expression of the power-political antagonism of the two countries in the region. The territorial dispute is now only the primary goal. Both governments use this war to document their claim to Kashmir, to secure domination at home and as an interstate "overpressure valve" that is activated in times of bilateral crises in order to avoid a major war. At the same time, the ecological aspect of the international dispute over Kashmir is becoming more and more important, as this area has very large water resources. Since 1989, the military conflict has sunk to the level of permanent border incidents on the Indian-Pakistani border. Since 1990, the Kashmir conflict has been overshadowed by the civil war in the Indian part of Kashmir, which is given an indirect intergovernmental component through the support of the Kashmiri-Muslim resistance by Pakistan (cf. War No. 188).


RESULTS OF THE WAR

The military conflicts continue below the war threshold - with strategic advantages for India (military control of the most important mountain passes). The unresolved Kashmir issue and the willingness of both states to accept military clashes, in view of the growing resistance potential among the Islamic majority in the Indian part of Kashmir, harbors the risk of the armed conflicts escalating.

Overall, the war claimed over 1,000 deaths, almost 80% of which were due to the hostile environmental conditions.



Reinhardt te Heesen

Pakistan (Sind, Jiye Sind Mahaz, 1986-1995)

AKUF database no .:

187

War duration:

11/1986 - 12/1995

War type:

B-2

End of war

by military victory side B (battles below the level of war)

Belligerents

page A

Jiye Sind Mahaz (Jeeya Sind Movement)

Side B.

Pakistan

additional side A:

Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) or (since 1997) Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) / Pashtun drug and weapons mafia and their armed militias / Pakistan People's Party (PPP) / Pakistan Muslim League (PML) / Sipah-i-Sahabu (Sunni ) / Therik-e-Jafria (Shiite)

additional side B:

Muhajir Qaumi Movement - Haqiqi (MQM-H)

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

Since 1986, the southern Pakistani province of Sindh and its metropolis Karachi have been the scene of an internal war in which a multitude of lines of conflict overlap. Firstly, militants from different ethnic groups fight each other to defend or enforce their rights: Sindhis fight against Muhajirs, Muhajirs against Pashtuns, and Sindhis and Muhajirs against Punjabis. Second, they all regularly come into conflict with state security organs, be they police forces, paramilitaries or regular army forces. Thirdly, in spite of all the corruption of the state apparatus, the same applies to the drug and weapons mafia, which is particularly active in Karachi and is dominated by Pashtuns. The focus of the violence since 1995, however, is fourthly the merciless fratricidal war between two warring factions of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) party and fifthly violent clashes between partisans of radical Sunni and Shiite groups.

The background to the conflict is the division of the colony of British India into the independent states of India (mostly Hindu) and Pakistan (Muslim) in 1947, in the course of which over fifteen million people voluntarily or involuntarily changed fronts and almost a million planned or planned victims spontaneous massacre. Most of the Muslims who fled to Pakistan settled in Karachi and from then on (and until today) called themselves muhajirs (refugees). They occupied key positions in trade, industry, administration and the military and also gained considerable national influence. The indigenous Sind population, on the other hand, saw themselves pushed into the second tier in their ancestral province and rebelled against the Muhajir dominance as well as against the discrimination by the Pakistani central government.

Accordingly, the demands of the Jeeya Sind movement include a proportional representation of Sindhi in the administration and the army, the reduction of the "foreign population share" in Sind and autonomy for the province of Sind. Radical nationalists are striving - analogous to the secession of the former East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971 (cf. War No. 111) - to found an independent state of Sindhu Desh. The Jeeya Sind movement was formed in May 1988 within the Sind National Alliance (SNA). In the movement there are points of connection with armed criminal gangs as well as disaffected policemen of Sindh origin.

The Sindhi-Muhajir conflict is overlaid by a conflict between Muhajirs and Pashtuns. Since independence, the Pashtuns had come to Karachi by the hundreds of thousands from their densely populated border province near Afghanistan and had brought Karachi's important transport sector under their control. After the start of the Afghan war (cf. War No. 141), in which Pakistan had the function of a deployment area for the Afghan mujahideen, Karachi had to take in up to 100,000 Afghan refugees, the majority of whom also belong to the Pashtun tribes. As part of the Afghan war economy, Karachi became a transshipment point for drugs and small arms, with Pashtun criminal organizations in charge. Under the conditions of the proverbial "Kalashnikov culture", the state power was less able than ever to guarantee the monopoly of force. As a result, society in and around Karachi organized itself even more "vertically"; H. familial, clan, or ethnic lineages.

As early as the early 1980s, the Muhajirs began to defend themselves against the increasing threats to their regional and national leadership positions from the Pashtuns, but also from the nationalist Sindhi movement. The dominant force among the Muhajirs, the MQM, founded in 1984, advocates the strengthening of the Muhajir identity, the recognition of the Muhajirs as "subnationality" and the containment of the growing economic and political influence of Pashtuns, Punjabis and Sindhsi in the Muhajir cities . The Sindhi-Muhajir and Muhajir-Pashtun conflicts have repeatedly escalated violently since November 1986, notably in Karachi and Hyderabad.


RESULTS OF THE WAR

The MQM became the strongest political force in Karachi and came temporarily to government in 1988 through a standstill agreement with the pro-Sindhic Pakistan People's Party under Benazir Bhutto. But the MQM became more and more of a threat to the Pakistani establishment and ultimately to the Pakistani state. When she won another election in 1992, the invasion of the Pakistani army prevented her from exercising governance in the province. This "operation clean-up" forced leading MQM cadres to go underground without the MQM being able to be defeated militarily. MQM leader Altaf Hussain even threatened a "new 1971", that is, the secession of Karachi or Sindh based on the Bangladesh model (cf. War No. 111). At the same time, the army and secret services promoted the split-off of a group of MQM dissidents who, as "true MQM" (MQM-Haqiqi), have been fighting a bloody battle for control of the Muhajir residential areas with the original MQM.

After the army withdrew in December 1994, the most violent manifestations of violence to date occurred in Karachi, killing over 2,000 people in twelve months. In October 1995, the central government stationed around 25,000 paramilitary rangers in the city, who in the course of 1996 were able to partially contain the confrontation with the MQM (Altaf) and the MQM-Haqiqi. A repeated (half-hearted) attempt to integrate the MQM (A) into the national mainstream by participating in a coalition government, this time under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League, failed miserably. Instead, a new series of violent eruptions was recorded in 1997, almost approaching that of 1995.

The understaffed, demoralized and corrupt police are unable to maintain the order of violence based on the state's monopoly of violence or to "recapture" the city. In large parts of the city, public order collapsed at times and the judicial system is helpless. Shootings between gangs of arms dealers, property speculators, drug lords and slum lords, however, are still the order of the day. It is not always possible to clearly distinguish between politically motivated violence, organized crime gang wars and vigilante justice. In the meantime, almost all of Karachi's political parties have developed into competing blackmail gangs. The "politics" of the parties in Karachi is largely characterized by the fact that the organization involved in political power only provides new infrastructure or police protection for those areas that are to be counted among its "strongholds".

So far, several thousand people have died in the war.


Thomas Köllmann / Boris Wilke

India / Pakistan (LoC, Kargil, 1998-1999)

AKUF database no .:

256

War duration:

1998 - 1999

War type:

C-2

End of war

through the mediation of third parties (battles below the level of war)

Belligerents

page A

India

Side B.

Pakistan

OBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFLICT

Relations between India and Pakistan experienced ups and downs in the 2003 reporting year. After lively contact between the two states began at the end of 2002, and this was viewed as a major step forward between the warring states, relations initially deteriorated again at the beginning of 2003. In the spring, both countries tested their medium-range nuclear missiles again. The situation on the Indian subcontinent threatened to escalate and only slowly eased in response to international pressure. With small steps India and Pakistan got closer again, so that the relations between the two countries at the turn of the year were considered to be as good as for a long time.

RESULTS OF THE WAR

Since its inception, India and Pakistan have waged six wars against each other, five of which have been related to the Kashmiri conflict. In the times between the wars, the clashes fell to the level of regular border incidents. The conflict-ridden relationship between the two states is based in particular on the controversial affiliation of the originally independent principality of Kashmir, which is at the same time the subject of the internal Indian Kashmir War (see the article on India (Kashmir)). Because of the different actors and their partly different goals, the interstate conflict must be distinguished from the internal Indian Kashmir war. The particularly explosive nature of the interstate conflict is due to the fact that India and Pakistan are not only considered to be the most highly armed countries in the so-called Third World, but also have nuclear weapons at their disposal.

In 1949, as a result of the first Indo-Pakistani war, Kashmir was divided into a Pakistani and an Indian administered area. These parts are separated by a ceasefire line, on which 40 UN observers perform purely documentary tasks. The main causes of the wars for Kashmir lie in the power-political rivalry between the two countries and in the fact that the abandonment of claims to Kashmir would affect the self-image of both countries. Pakistan was founded as the part of British India in which - as in Kashmir - a majority of Muslims live. India, on the other hand, saw itself as a secular state in which all religions and ethnic groups can live together. For India, a secession of Kashmir would also increase the risk of other independence conflicts intensifying and endanger the state unity of the socially very divided country.

A particularly controversial part of Kashmir is the Siachen Glacier, as the course of the armistice line in 1949 and 1965 was not determined there. Between 1984 and 1989, a war was waged here that killed around 1,000 people. From 1989 to 1998 the fighting along the ceasefire line moved back to the level of an armed conflict in the form of regular border incidents. In March 1998 there was a change of government in India, which was accompanied by a change of policy. Indian launch vehicle tests, nuclear weapons tests carried out by both countries in May and the questioning of the agreements that led to de-escalation on the Siachen Glacier in 1989 caused the border incidents to escalate into war again. In 1998, according to the Indian military, 331 Pakistani and 88 Indian soldiers were killed.

In April 1999, the Indian army came across a group of 800 to 900 armed men holed up in the mountains around Kargil. From this location a strip about six kilometers wide on the Indian side of the armistice line could be controlled. These fighters obviously had good high-mountain equipment, medium-weight weapons and a well-organized supply. The events quickly led to the international isolation of Pakistan. The US, traditionally allied with Pakistan, sided with India. China, which has always been a reliable ally for Pakistan, also behaved neutrally in this case. After Pakistan had in the meantime even threatened the use of nuclear weapons and the Indian army had recaptured most of the occupied territory, the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised the then US President Bill Clinton that the armed groups would withdraw, which he said Pakistan was accused of treason. On July 11, 1999, the military leaders of both countries agreed on a ceasefire. According to Indian sources, the fighting over Kargil in 1999 alone claimed the lives of 691 irregular fighters and Pakistani soldiers and 398 Indian soldiers. In addition, 578 Indians were wounded.

Politically, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian People's Party), which came to power in India in 1998 and which aggravated the conflict in its policy towards Pakistan, took advantage of the temporary escalation of the conflict. In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf became the new ruler after a coup on October 12, 1999. His family fled to Pakistan after the partition of British India. Like his foreign minister, he is considered a hardliner on Kashmir. Musharraf was accused by India of having played a leading role as chief of staff in the preparation of the invasion around Kargil and of having only very reluctantly followed the request to retreat.

In the period from July 1999 to September 2001, the clashes along the ceasefire line were again limited to the level of regular border incidents. The events of September 11th changed the situation considerably. India, which fought in Kashmir against groups that were partly trained in Afghanistan (see the article on India (Kashmir)), saw in the changed world situation the hope that the USA and other states would stand entirely on the side of India and Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict accuse of supporting cross-border terrorism.

Pakistan joined the "anti-terror alliance" against al-Qaeda and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Domestically, this decision was very problematic for Pakistan, as close ties existed between the Pakistani secret service, radical Islamic parties and the Taliban leadership. Up to a third of the Pakistani military were considered Taliban-friendly, and in the conflict over Kashmir, the Pakistani military worked with groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. In order to get the Pakistani population to agree to the realignment of Afghanistan policy, Musharraf declared that this was the only way to resolve the Kashmir issue in the Pakistani sense. The US would recognize that Pakistan is not a country that supports cross-border terrorism, but helps freedom fighters. The balancing act associated with fighting groups in Afghanistan on the one hand, but on the other hand supporting them in the conflict with India, was initially accepted by the USA because Pakistan was seen as too important for the war.

The USA, traditionally allied with Pakistan, lifted the economic sanctions that they had imposed on the two countries after their 1998 nuclear test after India and Pakistan joined the "anti-terror alliance". This was particularly important for Pakistan as it does not have a stable domestic economy like India. The lifting of the sanctions and promised far-reaching aid from Western states were the obvious consideration given to Pakistan for joining the "anti-terrorist alliance".

As early as the end of October 2001, the clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops along the armistice line intensified significantly. Another escalation occurred after the attack on the Indian parliament building in New Delhi on December 13, 2001 (see article on India (Kashmir)). The Indian government blamed the Pakistani operating groups Lashkar-i-Toiba (Army of the Pure) and Jaish-i-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) as well as the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for the attack and demanded it Immediate ban on the two groups in Pakistan and arrest of their leaders. Otherwise India threatened to take military action against bases of the two groups in Pakistan, referring to the actions of the "anti-terror alliance" in Afghanistan. Such an approach would have found great support in India. Many Indians did not understand why 23,000 to 75,000 people who had died in the internal Indian Kashmir War since 1990 did not legitimize India to take steps comparable to those of the USA. In their opinion, these deaths are also the result of cross-border Islamic terrorism, far fewer people died in the USA and the evidence is much clearer that the attacks are connected with - in the case of Kashmir's Pakistani training camps.

Pakistan was slow and inadequate in meeting India's demands. At first it only froze the accounts of the two groups.It was very problematic for Musharraf to crack down on the two groups. After he had combined his radical change of course in Afghanistan policy with the solution of the Kashmir question, he was not able to fight the groups in his own country that were always called freedom fighters for Kashmir.

Both India and Pakistan not only moved large troops along the ceasefire line to the border and mined areas outside of Kashmir that had not been mined until then. Despite smaller skirmishes along the entire border, in which several soldiers and civilians were killed, both states repeatedly assured that they were not interested in a war and that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but would defend their territory.

In a programmatic televised speech on January 12, 2002, Pakistani President Musharraf appealed to his fellow citizens to reject the religiously motivated violence and intolerance inside and outside the country's borders. In the speech he announced a ban on Lashkar-i-Toiba and Jaish-i-Muhammad and assured that Pakistan would take action against cross-border terrorism in its own country. His direct statements on Kashmir that Pakistan would continue to "morally, diplomatically and politically support the liberation struggle in Kashmir" showed, however, that its basic attitude had not changed. India welcomed the speech as a step in the right direction, but made a troop reduction to pre-crisis levels conditional on a decline in the infiltration of Pakistani rebels.

However, after an attack on a military settlement in Kashmir in May 2002, the situation escalated. There were small battles every day along the border. At least 115 people were killed in the second half of May. India pulled up to 1 million soldiers, plus fighter planes, missiles and tanks, to the armistice line and sent five warships to reinforce its western fleet in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan withdrew soldiers from the border with Afghanistan and UN blue helmets in Sierra Leone to be stationed in Kashmir and carried out tests with medium-range missiles. At the end of May, several states advised their citizens living in India and Pakistan to leave the countries and reduced their embassy staff to the bare minimum. At the same time, more foreign ministers and diplomats came to India and Pakistan to attempt mediation than ever before in such a short period of time. Together, the Americans, the British, the Russians, the Chinese, the Japanese, the French and the Germans tried to de-escalate the situation. It was noticeable that, in contrast to previous crisis situations, everyone undertook joint efforts from a relatively neutral position. In the first week of June, the international mediation attempts showed success. Individual incidents along the ceasefire line were reported, but from October both sides reduced their troop presence along the border.

On February 8, 2003, the rapprochement between the two states came to an abrupt end. India expelled the Pakistani high commissioner and was accused of financing separatist groups in Kashmir. Two days later, the Indian High Commissioner had to leave Pakistan. After a massacre of 24 Hindus in the Indian part of Kashmir on March 24, the situation at the border worsened again (see the report on India (Kashmir)). The Pakistani and Indian border troops fought skirmishes with heavy artillery. Two days after the massacre, blamed for Islamist groups in Pakistan, India tested a nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile and Pakistan responded just hours later by testing a launcher.

On April 18, there was a change of course in Indian foreign policy. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee offered to resume diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Vajpayee continued to advocate permanent normalization of relations between the two states. The Pakistani side reacted positively to this surprising offer, which was not subject to conditions as it used to be. On April 29, the first telephone conversation between the heads of government of both countries took place in 18 months.

The détente did not stop, although the violence in Kashmir continued. In May Vajpayee announced that it would again send an ambassador to Pakistan and resume transport and flight connections. At the end of November, the two sides finally agreed a ceasefire agreement on the border line that divides Kashmir into a Pakistani and Indian part, which has so far been respected. This does not seem to be just seasonal. As part of the South Asia Summit in Islamabad, the heads of government of the two neighboring countries met on January 4, 2004 for the first time in five years.

Hauke ​​Friederichs

Pakistan (Balochistan II, BLA, 2005-2008)

AKUF database no .:

318

War duration:

01.07.2005 - 31.12.2008

End of war

Belligerents

page A

Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

Side B.

Pakistan

Provincial elections were held in Balochistan on February 18, 2008, at the same time as the Pakistani parliamentary elections. Both the new Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the newly elected Governor of Balochistan Province tried later in the year to promote the peace process with the BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army). Although the BLA has for its part declared a unilateral ceasefire, it has refused to talk to the government. The BLA left no doubt that it is still determined to fight for more autonomy, and even independence, from Pakistan.
Balochistan in the south-west of the country is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of area with 44 percent. It is rich in natural resources and in particular has large reserves of oil and natural gas. The geographic region of Balochistan is divided into a western half as part of the Iranian national territory and an eastern, Pakistani part. Since the end of British colonial rule, this demarcation had led the Baluchs to strive for independence and to the idea of ​​a Greater Balochistan. After a brief period of independence, the province was incorporated into Pakistan's territory in 1948 under pressure from Pakistan. In a phase of particularly repressive action by the state power in the region, several Baloch organizations were formed in 1973, including the BLA. The subsequent war from 1973 to 1977 was mainly fought by the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). Despite the rich natural gas reserves, Balochistan is considered the poorest region in Pakistan and the population is dissatisfied with the central government in Islamabad. When former President Pervez Musharraf came to power in a military coup in 1999, he began intensive exploration of the natural gas fields. Rebel movements formed, which mainly attacked strategic and transport-political targets as well as military posts in the region.
Towards the end of 2004, the previously barely active BLA appeared and opposed the expansion of the Pakistani military presence in the province. Their approach was characterized by targeted attacks on army posts and military convoys. Government facilities, oil and gas pipelines, as well as important transportation points were also among their goals. In 2005, President Musharraf massively expanded the military presence in Balochistan to around 123,000 soldiers. In December 2005, the Pakistani military responded to the BLA attacks by bombing individual districts. As a result of this disproportionate action by the army, in which the civilian population was particularly badly hit, the conflict escalated into war.
In the first half of 2006 there were almost daily clashes between security forces and rebels or attacks on military and strategically important targets and gas pipelines. The army and paramilitary forces used helicopters, heavy artillery and missiles in their attacks. Eventually the BLA was banned by the government and officially classified as a terrorist organization.
In August 2006, the military launched a large-scale offensive that focused on the Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts. On August 26, the politician, tribal and rebel leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was killed. Bugti, also known as the "Tiger of Balochistan", was a leading figure in the resistance. The action to kill Bugti, in which 20 soldiers and 40 rebels were killed as well as several important members of the Bugti clan, sparked unrest throughout the province. Students from the university in Balochistan responded with violent protests over the next few days. After Bugti's death, attacks on the police and military bases initially increased massively. Several infrastructure facilities were also blown up. Most of the time, the BLA assumed responsibility for blown gas and water pipelines. Although the BLA generally admitted to attacks, not all attacks on military bases and security forces could be clearly assigned, as the Taliban also gained increasing influence in Balochistan (see the report on Pakistan (Taliban)).
At the beginning of 2007, the number of armed clashes with military units initially fell. The BLA was weakened because some of the rebel leaders had fled or died in the fighting due to the increasing military presence. During the traditional Baluchi Sibbi Festival, President Musharraf announced that he was ready to negotiate with the rebels to end the violence. Musharraf turned to the BLA with the offer of extensive structural support programs and offered financial aid to modernize the province. The support promised by the president related to funding and building up the agricultural economy. Income from the oil and gas reserves as well as more political autonomy were not mentioned. Accordingly, the rebels were unimpressed by his offer and their spokesman, Bebarg Baloch, announced that the BLA would continue to fight.
From April 2007, the fighting intensified again, with the reports on the number of deaths from the official side and the BLA clearly contradicting each other. For example, Bebarg Baloch announced that around 30 security guards were killed in one such clash, but the government put four deaths in the same incident. During 2007 the police managed to arrest several BLA leaders. During these actions, weapons and ammunition from the rebels were also seized. On the day Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti died, the nationalist parties of Balochistan and various student organizations called for a strike. The subsequent clashes between the police and demonstrators resulted in eight deaths.
Compared to the previous year, the violence in the reporting year 2008 increased again significantly. At the beginning of the year, the rebels canceled a unilateral ceasefire that they had recently announced. As a justification, the BLA referred to the ongoing military operations in the region. In fact, the presence of the military, security forces such as the Frontier Corps, and police units is very high in Balochistan. This has to do with the almost daily acts of sabotage by the BLA, but also with the increasing spread of the Taliban in the border region with Afghanistan.
At the time the newly elected government took office, the fighting and attacks intensified. When the province's new governor, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi, declared in April that the provincial government's top priority was the peace process and offered a dialogue with the rebels. However, this offer was officially rejected by the BLA a few days later. In May, Prime Minister Gilani announced that he had suspended military operations in Balochistan until further notice and, together with representatives of the provincial government, had developed a strategy to restore order and normalcy in the region. In fact, a few days later, the Frontier Corps was withdrawn from the provincial capital Quetta and the city of Gwadar and its duties were handed over to the local police. However, the military units remained stationed in the region. The rebel leader Bramdagh Khan Bugti, a grandson of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, also turned down talks with the government. In his explanatory statement, he drew attention to the poor living conditions of the members of the Bugti clan and stated that the fighting would intensify if the military did not withdraw.
Indeed, there is deep distrust of the government in Islamabad. Like the offer made by former President Musharraf, the new government is also negating the BLA's demands. In the discussions offered, the topics of autonomy, control or participation in the utilization of natural resources and the lack of jobs in the region are not addressed. In addition, the rebels believe that the new leadership is not strong enough to prevail against the powerful Pakistani army. The growing strength of the Taliban, which is causing unrest, and the influx of refugees from Afghanistan into the region are seen as problems for which the central government cannot be expected to support. Conversely, the rebels are clearly in a weaker position, which makes a military enforcement of their demands appear unlikely. This is likely to be the main reason why the BLA declared another ceasefire on September 1, 2008. It is difficult to imagine that this will last in view of the different and so far incompatible interests of the rebels and the government.

Doris note

Further literature and sources of information:

  • Orywal, Erwin: War or Peace. A comparative study of culture-specific ideals - The civil war in Balochistan / Pakistan, Berlin 2002
  • Quuddus, S.A .: The Tribal Beluchistan, Lahore 1990
  • Siddiqi, Akhtar Hussain: Baluchistan (Pakistan): Its Society, Resources, and Development, Langham 1991
  • www.dawn.com (Pakistani daily newspaper)
  • www.pak.gov.pk (Government of Pakistan)
  • www.thefridaytimes.com (Pakistani weekly newspaper)
  • www.satp.org (South Asia Terrorism Portal)

Pakistan (Taliban, 2007 - ongoing)


Armed conflict in Pakistan since 1993

  • Pakistan (Sind, 1995-2002)
  • Pakistan (religious conflict 1995 -)
  • India / Pakistan (Kargil, LoC, 1999-)


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